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NOTE, DUE PROCESS-HABEAS

REVIEW

AND OUTSIDE INFLUENCES ON THE

JURY-THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
BUTTONS DEPICTING THE VICTIM'S

PHOTO, WORN BY IMMEDIATE FAMILY
DURING MURDER TRIAL, POSE AN
UNACCEPTABLE RISK OF IMPERMISSIBLE
INFLUENCE ON THE JURY UNDER
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
S. Brannon Latimer*

HE Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Musladin v. LamarqueI concluded that buttons bearing an image of the victim and worn by
the victim's family at trial, prejudiced the jury and violated the
accused's right to a fair trial. It reached this conclusion by misconstruing
the authority of federal appellate decisions under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and by conducting an incomplete
legal and factual analysis. While the court's holding was erroneous, it
provides an opportunity for the Supreme Court to intervene in and clarify
two disputed areas of law: the precedential value of federal appellate decisions in habeas proceedings and the boundaries of permissible spectator
conduct in state criminal trials.
This note will begin with a factual and procedural summary of Musladin v. Lamarque and the Ninth Circuit's analysis. It will then criticize
the Ninth Circuit's holding and argue that neither supplementing nor substituting "clearly established Supreme Court law" with federal appeals
decisions is proper under the AEDPA. Next, it will critique the court's
application of both its own precedent and Supreme Court law and con* J.D. Candidate May 2007, Southern Methodist University School of Law; B.S.E.E.,
2003, Texas A&M University. I would like to thank my wife Meredity for her love and
support throughout our marriage and especially during law school, and my family for their
patience and encouragement over the last quarter-century. I would also like to thank the
authors of Appellate Law & Practice, http://appellate.typepad.com, a legal blog which first
brought this case to my attention, and the diligent staff and editors of the SMU Law
Review.
1. 427 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005).
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clude that Musladin presents an ideal opportunity for the Supreme Court
to address two unresolved areas of law: the constraints the AEDPA imposes on federal courts in habeas proceedings and the boundaries of permissible spectator conduct in a state criminal jury trial.
In May of 1994, Mathew Musladin shot and killed Mr. Struder, the fianc6 of his estranged wife Pam. Musladin traveled to Pam's house to
pick up their son for visitation, and while there he and Pam engaged in an
argument outside her house. Musladin pushed her to the ground, drawing the attention of Struder and Pam's brother. Musladin then returned
to his car and drew a gun; the others fled. Musladin fired at Struder,
hitting him in the shoulder, and fired again as the he attempted to crawl
beneath a car in the garage. The bullet ricocheted and struck Struder in
the head, killing him. At trial, Musladin admitted to killing Struder but
claimed self-defense. According to Musladin's account of the facts, after
he pushed Pam, Struder and Pam's brother approached him from the
house, carrying weapons and making threats. Musladin claimed that he
then grabbed a gun from his car and fired for his own safety, fleeing immediately thereafter. Throughout the fourteen-day trial, members of
Struder's family sat behind the prosecutor, each wearing a button between two and four inches in diameter containing Struder's photograph.
Except for the picture of Struder, the buttons bore no language or symbol. The defense asked the trial judge to order that the buttons be re2
moved, but this request was denied.
Musladin was convicted of first-degree murder and subsequently
sought review and post-conviction relief pursuant to state procedure.
These attempts failed and he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
the District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging in part
that the presence of the spectators' buttons during the trial created an
"unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play" that
was inherently prejudicial to his right to a fair trial. The district court
3
denied his petition and he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that under "clearly-established" Supreme Court law and Ninth Circuit precedent, the state court's conclusion-that the spectator buttons did not violate Musladin's right to a fair
trial free from outside influences-was objectively unreasonable. 4 Musladin's habeas petition is governed by the AEDPA, which limits habeas
relief to instances when the state court's decision is contrary to or an
unreasonable application of "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."'5 Although the Ninth
Circuit initially noted that Supreme Court cases are the sole source of
clearly established law under the AEDPA, the court added
'that
"prece2. Id. at 654-55, 661-62.
3. Id. at 654-55.
4. Id. at 654. Judge Thompson, dissenting, argued that Norris v. Riseley, 918 F.2d 828
(9th Cir. 1990), should be distinguished because the buttons worn by Struder's family did
not convey a message. Id. at 662 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 655 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2005)).
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dent from [the Ninth Circuit], or any other federal circuit court, has
per6
suasive value" when determining what law is clearly established.
Recognizing that the accused has a constitutional right to "a fair trial
by an impartial jury free from outside influences," the Ninth Circuit identified two Supreme Court cases applying this principle to spectator conduct, Estelle v. Williams and Holbrook v. Flynn.7 Estelle held that due
process bars states from compelling defendants to wear prison clothing
during trial because "an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible
factors coming into play," interfering with the presumption of innocence. 8
The Musladin court determined that this was the pivotal test: if a practice
presents "an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play"
at trial so as to be "inherently prejudicial" to the defendant, it is condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
In Holbrook, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a potentially prejudicial practice. 10 The presence of four uniformed
state troopers sitting in the front row of the courtroom, directly behind
the defendants during trial, did not offend due process because the "inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence
.. . need not be . . . that [the defendant] is particularly dangerous or

culpable." 1 1 The Ninth Circuit explained that, in Holbrook, the Court
determined that the officers' presence at trial would not lead to any impermissible inferences on the part of the jury "so long as their numbers or
weaponry [did] not suggest particular official concern or alarm."1 2 Thus
the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he law concerning the 'inherently
prejudicial' nature of courtroom practices which convey an impermissible
message ...

remained unchanged and clear.

'13

Having already decided that federal appellate decisions have persuasive value under the AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit turned its attention to its
previous holding in Norris v. Risley. 14 In Norris, several women agreed

to attend a rape trial wearing buttons which read "Women Against
Rape." 1 5 The Norris court analyzed these facts under Estelle, to determine whether the buttons created an "unacceptable risk of impermissible
factors coming into play[.]" It concluded that, like the compelled wearing
of prison garb, the buttons continuously reminded the jury of the defendant's status as the accused. 16 Their "obvious communicative purpose...
was far [clearer] and [more] direct than that deemed unlawful in [Estelle
6. Id. (citations omitted). See infra notes 35-36 for discussion of cited authority.
7. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 656 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)).
8. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505.
9. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 656.
10. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 570-71.
11. Id. at 569.
12. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 656-57.
13. Id. at 657.
14. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990).
15. Id. at 830.
16. Id. at 834.
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17
v.] Williams[,]" and thus violated the defendant's due process rights.
Applying these cases to Musladin, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
State court "was objectively unreasonable both in its ultimate conclusion
and in the rationale it employed in denying Musladin's appeal" for two
reasons. 18 First, the state court attempted to distinguish Norris when
"Norris simply cannot reasonably be distinguished."' 9 The state court
held that the buttons were "unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything other than the normal grief occasioned by the loss of a family member[,]" but the Ninth Circuit held that this conclusion is both objectively
unreasonable and wrong as a matter of law because courts must examine
the specific message carried by the buttons in light of the facts
presented. 20 Under the facts of Musladin, a court must hold that "a reasonable jurist would be compelled to conclude that the buttons worn by
Struder's family members conveyed the message that the defendant was
21
guilty, just as the buttons worn by spectators in Norris did[.]"

Second, according to the Ninth Circuit, the state court erroneously concluded that, although the buttons were an "impermissible factor," relief
was not appropriate because they did not brand the defendant with an
"unmistakable mark of guilt."'22 In the Ninth Circuit's view, Estelle and
Holbrook "announced" that once there is "a finding of an unacceptable
risk of impermissible factors coming into play," the inquiry is over because the practice is "inherently prejudicial" and therefore unconstitutional. 23 The court asserted that both Estelle and Holbrook "are clear as
to the legal standard, and neither suggested that 'branding' was

necessary. "24
The Ninth Circuit's Musladin decision is flawed because it relied on
appellate court precedent as a source of clearly established law, a practice
explicitly condemned by Congress in the AEDPA. The AEDPA went
into effect in 1996 to govern federal court intervention in state criminal
cases. 2 5 Prior to the statute, federal courts entertaining habeas petitions
reviewed state court decisions de novo. 26 The AEDPA significantly restricted this practice, barring lower federal courts from considering their
own precedent in habeas proceedings and restricting the source of rele17. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 657-58 (citing Norris, 918 F.2d at 831-32). Here, the word
"Rape" was "underlined with a broad red stroke" on the spectators' buttons. Norris, 918

F.2d at 830.
18. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 658.
19. Id. at 660.
20. Id. at 658.
21. Id. at 660-61.
22. Id. at 658.
23. Id. at 658-59.
24. Id. at 659.
25. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of
Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 226 (2002).
26. Dodson, supra note 25, at 226 (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994);
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1985); O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.
1998)).
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vant case law to Supreme Court decisions. 27 It was meant "to ensure a
level of 'deference to the determinations of state courts' 2 8 and promote
federalism and finality 29 by curbing delays, preventing "retrials" via fed-

eral habeas, and giving greater effect to state convictions. 30 The Supreme
Court performed a detailed analysis of the statute and affirmed the
AEDPA's restrictive effect on federal courts in Williams v. Taylor,3 1 interpreting it to mean that
[i]f [the Supreme] Court has not broken sufficient legal ground to
establish an asked-for constitutional principle, the lower federal
courts cannot themselves establish such a principle with clarity sufficient to satisfy the AEDPA bar .... As [the Seventh Circuit] explained: "This is a retrenchment from former practice, which allowed
the United States courts of appeals to rely on their own jurisprudence in addition to that of the Supreme Court. The novelty in this
portion [of the AEDPA] is... the reference to 'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' This . .. limit[s]
the source of doctrine on which
a federal court may rely in address'32
ing the application for a writ."
The Musladin court's reliance on Norris is in direct opposition to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the AEDPA because Musladin placed
Norris on equal analytical footing with Supreme Court case law. Although the court characterized the Norris decision as merely persuasive,
it applied Norris as Estelle's equivalent throughout its analysis when articulating the legal test to be applied. 33 The court admitted as much, declaring its "reliance on Norris . . . appropriate[.] '' 34 But none of the
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2005). The AEDPA states in pertinent part that: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States .. " Id.
28. Williams, 529 U.S. at 386 (citing H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, p. 111 (1996)).
29. Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 176 (2003).
30. Williams, 529 U.S. at 386.
31. Id. at 404-16.
32. Id. at 381-82. (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis
in original).
33. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 655-61 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 427
F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005). The weight placed on Norris is apparent: "AEDPA limits the
source of clearly established federal law to Supreme Court cases. Nevertheless, we recognize that precedent from this court, or any other federal circuit court, has persuasive value
in our effort ...." Id. at 655 (citations omitted) (authority discussed further infra, notes
35-36). The court moreover framed its legal inquiry in terms of Norris: "we must therefore
assess whether the buttons ...at the trial posed a risk of impermissible factors coming into
play that is similar to those previously found to exist in other circumstances, such as in ...
[Estelle v.] Williams ... and . . . Norris." Id. at 656. It concluded in the same manner:
"Because we conclude that no significant difference exists between the circumstance of this
case and the 'unacceptable risks' found to exist in Williams and Norris, we hold that the
state court unreasonably applied established Supreme Court law in denying Musladin relief." Id.
34. Id. at 657.
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justifications the Ninth Circuit offered for this maneuver withstand scrutiny. It first asserted that granting appellate decisions persuasive weight
under the AEDPA is accepted, citing other circuits purportedly in agreement. 35 However, a closer look at the cited support indicates that the
court's sweeping dismissal of the statute's effect is unprecedented. 36 The
Ninth Circuit proceeded to offer two additional reasons for adopting the
Norris analysis. First, it asserted that because the same legal and factual
issues are at stake-whether buttons worn by spectators at a jury trial
were impermissible factors-Norris is entitled to reliance. 37 Second, it
argued that Norris controls because the state court "sought to apply [it]
when reaching its determination. ' 38 Indeed, the state court would be
wise to consider Norris in its analysis (it did), but even if the cases were
factually identical (they were not), the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the AEDPA unmistakably excluded federal appellate decisions as sources
of clearly established law. 39 A state court may choose to consider federal
appellate decisions, but it is free to follow, refute, or completely ignore
their conclusions. 40 The Ninth Circuit thus erred by relying upon Norris
35. See id. at 655-65 (citing Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000);
Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d
667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999)).
36. See Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 647, 649-51 (9th Cir. 2005) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting, joined by Kozinski, J., O'Scannlain, J., Tallman, J.,
Bybee, J., Callahan, J., and Bea, J.) [hereinafter Musladin III.
The panel notes that the Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Bowersox held that the
"diversity of opinion" among federal courts on a particular issue suggested
that the state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent.
But saying that the state court decision is not unreasonable because some
federal courts have reached similar conclusions is not at all the same as saying that the state court decision is unreasonable because a circuit court has
reached a contrary conclusion. The First Circuit in Ouber v. Guarino and the
Third Circuit in Matteo v. Superintendent come much closer to supporting the
panel's decision, but our panel is unique in how boldly it has flown in the face
of the statutory restriction to Supreme Court decisions.
Id. at 650-51. The dissent also points out that at least four circuits have explicitly held that
the AEDPA limits the source of clearly established law to Supreme Court cases, and federal appellate decisions are not applicable to a habeas inquiry. Id. at 650 (citing Mitzel v.
Tate, 267 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Welch v. City of Pratt, 214 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th
Cir. 2000); Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir. 1996); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149,
162 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that "any independent opinions we offer on the
merits of the constitutional claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us,
nor any precedental effect for state courts in future cases. At best, it constitutes a body of
constitutional dicta.")).
37. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 657-580.
38. Id. The two arguments are actually one, since factual parallels must have motivated the state court to consider Norris in the first place. Furthermore, it is inconceivable
that the Musladin court would have ruled differently had the state court not considered
Norris in its decision. The Ninth Circuit would likely consider such an omission proof of
faulty analysis and a more compelling reason to apply Norris on review.
39. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82, 404-16 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 356, 869
(7th Cir. 1996)).
40. See Musladin If, 427 F.3d at 549-50.
California could properly decide the case at bar by distinguishing Norris, disagreeing with Norris, or in complete ignorance of Norris. Under AEDPA's
restriction to Supreme Court decisions, we are obligated to deny the writ so
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in its analysis of Musladin's habeas petition. The only clearly established
Supreme Court law directly on point with Musladin-the Williams rule
against reliance on Norris-is unjustifiably discarded by the Ninth
41
Circuit.
But even accepting Norris as persuasive authority, careful analysis
shows that the state court's decision was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law. The Musladin court placed great weight on
the factual similarities between the case on appeal and its prior holding in
Norris. It's of "striking factual similarities" between Norris and Musladin, however, cannot survive a close comparison of the cases. 4 2 The
women donning the buttons in Norris were members of the National Organization of Women ("NOW") and an interest group called the Rape
Task Force. This organized group created the buttons with a clear message, literally "Women Against Rape, ' 43 and collaborated so that at all
times, at least three women wearing buttons were in the court room. Astonishingly, the women had significant contact with the jurors outside the
courtroom-they rode on the elevators together, stood near the courtroom entrance, and sold the jurors refreshments during breaks. 44 Also, in
response to questioning during an evidentiary hearing, one of the women
from NOW declared that wearing the buttons "was a statement [they]
were making and "that they wanted to see some action taken[.]" '45 Another woman from the task force admitted that they were 'anxious for a
conviction' and that its members believed Norris guilty even before hearing the evidence." '46 Finally, an evidentiary hearing six years after the trial
revealed that three of the six jurors who testified could recall the wo47
men's presence and the buttons they wore.
These facts bear little resemblance to Musladin. There, the buttons
bore no literal message, only an image that may not have even been discernable from the jury box. The individuals who wore them were members of the deceased's immediate family, and there was no evidence
long as the California decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Estelle and [Holbrook v.] Flynn.
Id.
41. See id. at 647.
Our decision in this case has the practical effect of erasing the statutory
phrase "as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Our
tools for statutory construction are many, but they do not include an eraser.
Yet here we go, erasing the "clearly established" phrase and expanding the
"as determined" phrase. The statute in nine states now says, as a practical
matter, "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States, giving "persuasiveweight" to Ninth Circuit decisions that have applied
Supreme Court decisions." We do not have that legislative authority.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
42. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 658.
43. Norris, 918 F.2d at 830.
44. Id. at 829-31.
45. Id. at 832 n.3 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 831.
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indicating they intended to influence the jurors or the trial atmosphere.
There were no evidentiary findings that the jurors ever saw the buttons or
the family members. 48 In short, the only common element was that the
spectators wore buttons. In view of these factual discrepancies, the Ninth
Circuit addressed whether the state court was "objectively unreasonable"
in distinguishing Norris from Musladin.49 It authoritatively answered that
it was. According to this court, under clearly established Supreme Court
law as understood by its holding in Norris, spectators wearing buttons
depicting a photo of a victim at trial created such a risk of impermissible
influence on the jury that a new trial was warranted. This holding is in
direct conflict with several other jurisdictions5 0 and, surprisingly, an un51
published Ninth Circuit case decided just one year earlier.
Carefully examining the relevant Supreme Court cases further illustrates the Ninth Circuit's error. As the dissent to the denial of rehearing
en banc noted, the Musladin facts are more like those in Holbrook than
those in Estelle.52 Estelle involved a defendant who was compelled to
wear prison clothing, and the Court condemned this unambiguous statement of government accusation toward the defendant. 53 Holbrook, however, examined the presence of several uniformed law enforcement
officers at trial and concluded that their presence was permissible because of a wide range of possible inferences that the jury could have
drawn from their presence. 54 "With these two Supreme Court cases as
bookends-showing what denies due process and what does not-the
California courts were well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation in determining that this case is more like [Holbrook]. '55 Yet the
48. See Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 662, reh'g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 647
(9th Cir. 2005).
49. Id. at 661.
50. See North Carolina v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 176-77 (N.C. 1996) (holding that
the wearing of buttons with the victim's photo did not prejudice the jury when there was no
factual showing that the jury noticed them); Pachl v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088, 1090-94 (Or.
Ct. App. 1996) (upholding conviction despite presence of spectators during trial wearing
buttons bearing the words "Crime Victims United"); Cooper v. Virginia, 2004 Va. App.
LEXIS 403, *10 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that buttons bearing photo of victim, worn by
spectators during trial, were not inherently prejudicial and upholding the conviction because nothing in the record showed that they caused the defendant actual prejudice); In re
Personal Restraint of Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (holding that allowing victims' families to wear ribbons in remembrance of the victims at trial did not prejudice the
defendant's right to a fair trial);.
51. Palumbo v. Ortiz, 89 Fed. App'x 3 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the state trial judge
allowed members of the victim's family to wear buttons bearing the victim's image in the
courtroom. On habeas review, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court
has not ruled on whether actual prejudice must result from spectators wearing badges in
the courtroom, the California Court of Appeal's decision can not be contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. Nor was it an unreasonable application of precedent." Id. at 5. The court
then discussed Holbrook and Norris, noting that "the California Court of Appeal was
bound neither by our result [in Norris], nor by our use of the Holbrook test. We cannot
grant Palumbo's petition based on the Court of Appeal's divergence from Norris." Id.
52. See Musladin H, 427 F.3d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 2005) (denial of rehearing en banc).
53. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976); Musladin 11, 427 F.3d at 648.
54. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 562 (1986); see also Musladin H,427 F.3d at 649.
55. Musladin I1,
427 F.3d at 649.
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problems do not en there. As one can note, closer scrutiny of the Ninth
56
Circuit's reasoning casts even more doubt on Musladin's integrity.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's erroneous decision in Musladin should be
reviewed by the Supreme Court for five reasons. First, by undermining
the effect the AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit installed itself as the overseer of
the criminal courts in nine states. "Few things incumbent on powerful
government officials are more fundamental than their duty to comply
with the legal limitations on their power."'57 The Supreme Court should
intervene to reaffirm the AEDPA's limit on federal judicial power. Second, the Musladin decision raises important questions about the constitutional limitations of spectator influence at trial. Here lies a delicate
balance of constitutional guarantees. On one hand is the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right to a fair trial free from outside influences. On
the other are the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial and the
First Amendment's protection of free expression. Scholars and courts
alike are divided on the proper solution, and the Supreme Court should
bring clarity to this area by articulating guidelines for trial judges.
Whether these issues are resolved on review of Musladin, or on another
case yet to be decided, one thing is certain: the "clearly established" law
of Musladin v. Lamarque is neither clear, nor established.

56. For example, consider the Ninth Circuit's misleading analysis of Holbrook, maintaining that it simply reaffirmed Estelle's holding that any practices "inherently prejudicial"
to the defendant are condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment. Musladin v. Lamarque,
427 F.3d 655, 656 (9th Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005). But
Holbrook, decided ten years after Estelle, made clear that "close scrutiny of inherently
prejudicial practices has not always been fatal." Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568. Thus the Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. Allen that, although binding and gagging the defendant
would no doubt prejudice the jury against him, in certain situations it could be "the fairest
and most reasonable way to handle" a dangerous and disruptive defendant and would thus
be acceptable. Id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)).
Other problems lurk. The Ninth Circuit fails to address the fact that Holbrook characterized the Estelle holding as resting at least in part on equal protection grounds rather
than due process, because the defendants most likely to be compelled to wear prison garb
at trial were those who could not afford to post bail. See id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
But perhaps the most astonishing aspect of the Musladin opinion was its emphatic condemnation of the state court's view that the buttons were likely to be perceived as an expression of grief. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 658. As the dissent in Musladin II notes, "[spectator]
communication is an unavoidable consequence of the Constitutional guarantee of 'public
trial'.... There is nothing wrong with the jury knowing people care about the case and the
parties." Musladin 11, 427 F.3d at 651.
Finally, note that Norris was decided in 1990, pre-AEDPA. Before the statute, federal
courts reviewed habeas petitions de novo. See Dodson, supra note 25. Thus the restrictive
standard of review imposed by the AEDPA may have altered the outcome of that case,
calling its precedential value into question. The Ninth Circuit's failure to address any of
these concerns when determining whether a state interpretation was "objectively unreasonable" is alarming.
57. Musladin 11, 427 F.3d at 651.
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